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“All existing reservations on the east bank of said river shall be, and 
the same is, set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation 
of the Indians herein named . . . .” 
 
TREATY WITH THE SIOUX – 1868, 15 Stat. 635 
 
The main goal of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is to compel 
government agencies to look for and discover possible environmental issues 
before making decisions that could impact the environment. The statute goes on to 
require an intensive review process when an environmental issue arises. NEPA 
can temporarily stop federal projects when an agency has not followed proper 
procedure or adequately considered certain factors. This Note proposes that under 
NEPA, courts should consider how agency decisions impact tribal treaty rights. 
The obligation to consider treaty rights come both from the treaty rights 
themselves and from the federal government’s trust obligation to Native American 
tribes.  
The Note will discuss this issue through Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, a recent challenge to the Army Corps’ decision to grant 
an easement for the Dakota Access Pipeline. The Note will look to past 
infringements on Sioux land and treaty rights and then discuss the NEPA 
framework. Next, the Note will explain the current challenge and touch on cases 
that deal with treaty rights inside and outside of NEPA. Finally, the Note argues 
that the government’s trust obligation requires better treatment and 
acknowledgement of tribal treaty rights in the NEPA context.
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“Highest Responsibility and Trust”: The National 
Environmental Policy Act & the Dakota Access 
Pipeline 
MAEGAN FAITSCH * 
INTRODUCTION 
The protests at Standing Rock drew national attention to the clash 
between fossil fuel and tribal interests in Lake Oahe, North Dakota.1 After 
the Army Corps granted an easement through the lake in 2016, the 
Standing Rock Sioux began a legal challenge, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.2 This suit requested both declaratory and 
injunctive relief to halt the construction of the pipeline for, among other 
things, violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).3 The 
injunction was denied,4 but decisions made by the Obama Administration 
changed the landscape, promising further review and halting future action 
on the pipeline. 
After several decisive steps, including a memorandum from the 
Solicitor of the Interior noting issues with the Army Corps’ environmental 
assessment,5 the Army Corps reversed its decision. The Army Corps 
announced on December 4, 2016 that it would not grant an easement for 
the Lake Oahe crossing and that NEPA required a more thorough 
                                                                                                                     
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2019; Grove City College, B.A. 2015. I would 
like to thank Professor Berger for her assistance turning my note proposal into a reality and for her 
constant feedback and advice throughout this process. I would also like to thank the members of the 
Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful editing and fantastic symposium on this issue. Finally, I 
would like to thank my family for their unwavering support and encouragement.   
1 Saul Elbein, These Are the Defiant “Water Protectors” of Standing Rock, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/01/tribes-standing-rock-dakota-access-
pipeline-advancement/; Benazir Wehelie, Sacred Ground: Inside the Dakota Pipeline Protests, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2016/12/us/dapl-protests-cnnphotos/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019); Justin 
Worland, What to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, TIME (Oct. 28, 2016), 
http://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-sioux/. 
2 Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 
(D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-1534).  
3 Id. at 2.  
4 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 37 (D.D.C. 2016). 
5 Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, to the Sec’y of the Interior, Tribal Treaty and 
Environmental Statutory Implications of the Dakota Access Pipeline (Dec. 4, 2016), available at 
https://www.scribd.com/document/340030811/Interior-Dept-Solicitor-Memo-On-Dakota-Access-
Pipeline. 
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environmental impact statement.6 The election of a new executive, 
however, led to another reversal. At the beginning of his term in office, 
President Trump issued an order allowing the pipeline to move forward.7 
As a result, the tribe revived its original challenge, filing a motion for 
summary judgment in February 2017 based in NEPA claims. This 
challenge became more urgent when the pipeline began pumping crude oil 
in June 2017.8  
In an order by D.C. District Court Judge Boasberg in June 2017, the 
tribe partially succeeded in its motion for summary judgment.9 The court 
found that the Corps did not adequately consider environmental justice and 
the tribe’s treaty rights when the Corps decided to grant the pipeline’s 
easement.10 The tribe’s challenge is not the first time NEPA has been used 
as an offensive measure by tribal nations in an effort to protect natural 
resources11—and this Note will explore the importance of considering 
tribal treaty rights in parallel with an agency’s NEPA analysis. Without 
courts calling on the federal government to fulfill its trust obligation to 
tribes, agencies will be given too much discretion when faced with a 
project opposed by tribal nations. At the very least, this can be remedied by 
courts requiring an agency to perform a more thorough Environmental 
Impact Statement when an action involves a tribe’s treaty rights.  
This Note argues for special consideration of tribal treaty rights when 
an action requires a NEPA analysis because of the government’s trust 
obligation. Part I will give a brief history of Sioux challenges to 
encroachments on its reservation land and background of Sioux treaty 
rights. Part II will outline requirements under NEPA, environmental justice 
considerations, and how these fit into the tribal context. It will also discuss 
the findings of the D.C. District Court in the current challenge. Part III will 
draw on similarly situated cases involving NEPA and non-NEPA treaty 
                                                                                                                     
6 Memorandum from Jo Ellen Darcy, Assistant Sec’y of the Army, Proposed Dakota Access 
Pipeline Crossing at Lake Oahe, North Dakota 3, available at 
https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/459011.pdf. 
7 Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, 82 Fed. Reg. 18, 8861 (Jan. 30, 2017).  
8 Catherine Ngai et al., Dakota Access Pipeline Spilled Oil 84 Gallons of Oil in South Dakota, 
REUTERS (May 10, 2017, 5:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-dakota-pipeline-
spill/dakota-access-pipeline-spilled-oil-84-gallons-of-oil-in-south-dakota-idUSKBN1862VP. The 
pipeline process did not go without a hiccup, with eighty-four gallons of oil spilling from the pipeline 
in South Dakota, “100 miles (160 km) east of Lake Oahe.” Id. More recently, the Keystone Pipeline 
had a much larger spill in South Dakota, leaking 210,000 gallons of crude oil in November 2017. The 
location of the spill was near the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate reservation. Mitch Smith & Julie Bosman, 
Keystone Pipeline Leaks 210,000 Gallons of Oil in South Dakota, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/keystone-pipeline-leaks-south-dakota.html. 
9 U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs’ Opposition to Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment & Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2–3, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 160 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:16-cv-01534 (JEB)). 
10 Id.  
11 See infra notes 15562 and accompanying text (highlighting a previous instance of a tribe using 
NEPA offensively to protect natural resources).  
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rights claims and call for greater acknowledgement of tribal rights under 
the government’s fiduciary relationship with the Sioux tribe. This 
obligation, as a trustee, calls for the preservation of Native American rights 
to water, hunting, and fishing on allotted federal lands.  
I. HISTORICAL AND MODERN CONTEXT 
In order to understand the scope of tribal rights for Native Americans 
and their relationship to the land, it is essential to put the present-day 
litigation in a historical context. Encroachments onto Sioux land by both 
the federal government and private parties have a long history. Systemic 
loss of the reservation through past public works projects and treaty 
reconfigurations makes this fight over a crude oil pipeline one part of a 
larger picture of disputes over Sioux territory. In the past, these federal 
projects often led to unconsidered effects on the lives of the tribes who 
lived there. There has been a past “bureaucratic disregard for consultation 
with indigenous people”12 adding to continued disenfranchisement for 
tribal nations attempting to cooperate with agencies in the current legal 
landscape.  
A. Sioux Treaty Rights and Past Challenges 
The Sioux challenged infringements on treaty rights in several lawsuits 
extending to the Supreme Court. The tribe often took different statutory 
routes in an attempt to preserve its land and promised rights under the 
Laramie treaties, among them the Indian Claims Commission Act. In this 
brief synopsis, this Note will attempt to draw on some of these examples to 
show the importance of the environmental framework as a future remedy 
for ensuring the continuation of treaty rights, when so many other attempts 
have failed. These treaty rights mainly include the ability to exercise water, 
hunting, and fishing rights, which are implicated in the pipeline decision.  
The reservation system for Native American tribes was formed in 
response to the desires of white settlers to expand across the country.13 The 
Standing Rock Sioux reservation was once a portion of the larger Great 
Sioux Nation’s reservation.14 The first treaty, the Fort Laramie Treaty of 
1851, contained much more land for the Sioux, encompassing half of 
                                                                                                                     
12 Leah Donnella, The Standing Rock Resistance Is Unprecedented (It’s Also Centuries Old), NPR 
(Nov. 22, 2016, 11:18 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2016/11/22/502068751/the-
standing-rock-resistance-is-unprecedented-it-s-also-centuries-old (quoting Kim Tallbear, Professor of 
Native American Studies at University of Alberta). 
13 See Kaylee Ann Newell, Federal Water Projects, Native Americans and Environmental 
Justice: The Bureau of Reclamation’s History of Discrimination, 20 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL. J. 40, 
42 (1997) (explaining that as “white settlers took over Native American lands, the removal policy gave 
way to the reservation system that exists today”). 
14 History, STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, https://www.standingrock.org/content/history (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2019).  
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modern-day South Dakota as well as parts of North Dakota, Nebraska, and 
Wyoming.15 The treaty expressly preserved the Sioux “privilege of 
hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of country” ceded by the 
treaty.16 In response to the federal government’s desire to expand 
westward—manifested in the cross-country railroad, along with settlers 
who wished to mine—the later iteration, the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, 
stripped the tribe of most of its land outside South Dakota,17 but did not 
abrogate tribal hunting and fishing rights. All treaties, moreover, contained 
implied hunting and fishing rights within their boundaries.18 In 1875, an 
executive order set land apart for the Standing Rock Sioux in the northern 
part of the Great Sioux Reservation.19 Congress then passed the 1877 Act, 
“abrogating the earlier Fort Laramie Treaty,” dividing the Great Sioux 
Reservation into several smaller reservations, and abrogating the Sioux 
right to the Black Hills.20 
The United States further diminished the Sioux reservations in the 
1950s to build the Lake Oahe Dam. The 1954 Cheyenne River Act took 
Cheyenne River Sioux land for the dam and recreational projects on the 
Missouri River.21 A 1958 act took over fifty thousand acres of Standing 
                                                                                                                     
15 The Treaties of Fort Laramie, 1851 & 1868, ST. HIST. SOC’Y N.D., Map 1, 
http://ndstudies.gov/gr8/content/unit-iii-waves-development-1861-1920/lesson-4-alliances-and-
conflicts/topic-2-sitting-bulls-people/section-3-treaties-fort-laramie-1851-1868 (last visited Feb. 7, 
2019). 
16 Treaty of Fort Laramie art. V, 1851, https://www.ndstudies.gov/gr8/content/unit-iii-waves-
development-1861-1920/lesson-1-changing-landscapes/topic-4-reservation-boundaries/section-2-
treaty-fort-laramie-1851. 
17 John S. Harbison, The Broken Promise Land: An Essay on Native American Tribal Sovereignty 
over Reservation Resources, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 347, 353 (1995). This led to systemic takings of 
Sioux land due to the expansionist desires of the federal government. Harbison further describes the 
timeline of the changes over almost a hundred years occurring to the Sioux reservation after the Fort 
Laramie Treaty: 
In 1875, the government ordered the Sioux to vacate the Bighorns and the Powder 
River country entirely. In 1876, after gold had been discovered in the Black Hills, 
the federal government procured an agreement from tribal chiefs that removed the 
Black Hills from the reservation. In 1889, under pressure to provide more land for 
white settlers, Congress abolished the Great Sioux Reservation, opened nine million 
acres of its territory to settlement, and created five smaller reservations – including 
the Cheyenne River Reservation – from the remaining land area. In 1908, Congress 
opened another 1.6 million acres on these reservations to homesteading. Finally, in 
the 1950s, the construction of a series of dams on the Missouri River inundated over 
202,000 acres of what land remained available to the Sioux on the five reservations. 
Id. at 353–54. See also The Treaties of Fort Laramie, 1851 & 1868, supra note 15, at Map 2. 
18 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 737–38 (1986).  
19 See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 320–21 (1942) (noting that the 
reservation was created by an executive order specifying “the tract of land involved and declaring that 
it ‘be, and the same hereby is, withdrawn from sale and set apart for the use of the several tribes of the 
Sioux Indians as an addition to their present reservation in said Territory’”).  
20 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 381 (1980). 
21 Cheyenne River Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 776, 68 Stat. 1191; South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 
U.S. 679, 683 (1993). 
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Rock Sioux land for the same purpose.22 Both of these acts contained 
similar language about the fishing and hunting rights of the Cheyenne 
River and Standing Rock Sioux,23 reserving for the tribes “access to the 
shoreline of the reservoir, including permission to hunt and fish in and on 
the aforesaid shoreline and reservoir[.]”24 
The Sioux have been fighting over the loss of their land for 
generations.  In 1923, Congress granted the tribe jurisdiction to sue for 
“misappropriation of any of the funds or lands of said tribe[.]”25 When the 
dispute reached the Supreme Court in 1942, however, the Court held that 
because the 1875 and 1876 reservations were created by executive order, 
the Sioux Nation had no right to compensation when the United States took 
their land.26 The Sioux persisted and won a partial victory in United States 
v. Sioux Nation of Indians in 1980. In that case, Justice Blackmun 
described the history of the U.S. government’s relationship with the Sioux, 
quoting: “[a] more ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealings will never, 
in all probability, be found in our history, which is not, taken as a whole, 
the disgrace it now pleases some persons to believe.”27 The Court decided 
that Congress did not grant the Sioux an appropriate sum when it took its 
hunting lands (among them the Black Hills) under the 1877 Act.28 This 
affirmed a lower court’s remedy for over $17 million in damages for the 
federal takings.29 While this was a “successful” legal challenge, it granted 
only monetary damages, not a right to return to their sacred Black Hills. As 
a result, the Sioux Nation has refused to accept the monetary award, which, 
with interest, now is worth over one billion dollars.30  
The Lake Oahe takings have also reached the Supreme Court. In South 
                                                                                                                     
22 Pub. L. No. 85-915, 72 Stat. 1762 (1958). In the tribe’s motion for summary judgment in the 
DAPL case, the tribe describes this land that was taken under the Flood Control Act as “the best 
remaining Reservation lands, supplying 90% of the Reservation’s timber, as well as wild berries and 
other plants essential the Tribe’s diet and religious purposes, habitat for animals hunted for subsistence, 
and fertile lands where families grew their food.” Plaintiff Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3–4, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:16-cv-01534-JEB), 2017 WL 
1454134 [hereinafter Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
23 Compare Pub. L. No. 85-915, § 10, 72 Stat. 1762, 1764 (1958), with Pub. L. No. 776, § 10, 68 
Stat. 1191, 1193 (1954). 
24 Pub. L. No. 85-915, § 10, 72 Stat. 1762, 1764 (1958). See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 18.02 (Nell Jessup Newton & Bethany R. Berger eds., 2017) (noting that 
“[s]tatutes and agreements ratified by Congress become, like treaties, the supreme law of the land, and 
preempt state laws to the contrary”). 
25 Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 384. 
26 Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329 (1942). 
27 Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 388 (quoting United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 518 
F.2d 1298, 1302 (Ct. Cl. 1975)). 
28 Id. at 422–24. 
29 Id. at 371–72. See also Shoemaker, infra note 35, at 77 (explaining that the Sioux tribe never 
took the money—with the total now over $1.3 billion). 
30 For Great Sioux Nation, Black Hills Can’t Be Bought for $1.3 Billion, PBS (Aug. 24, 2011) 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-the-sioux-are-refusing-1-3-billion. 
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Dakota v. Bourland, the Court held that the Cheyenne River and Standing 
Rock Sioux could no longer regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on the 
lands taken for the project.31 The Supreme Court found that the Flood 
Control Act and the Cheyenne River Act “abrogated” the tribe’s right to 
“absolute and undisturbed use and occupation” of the land, and as a result, 
the tribes did not have the ability to regulate non-Indians on the land.32 
Nevertheless, the Court explained, the Oahe Acts and the Flood Control 
Act did not abrogate Sioux treaty rights in the flooded territory.33 These 
cases demonstrate the long history of the Sioux Nation trying to remedy 
the loss of its historic lands; the DAPL pipeline is just another example of 
that loss. 
The Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) crosses the land originally 
granted in the 1851 Treaty and comes within a little over a half mile of the 
present-day Standing Rock Reservation.34 But instead of making a claim to 
the land being crossed by the pipeline, the tribe only claims its previously 
granted treaty rights to water, to hunt, and to fish on their existing 
reservation land.35 
II. NEPA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND TRIBAL NATIONS 
One of the statutes the tribe used to challenge the Dakota Access 
easement was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA 
mandates agencies to follow certain procedures before making decisions 
for federal projects that have environmental effects.36 Environmental 
justice arguments can strengthen NEPA protections, but without showing 
the agency action is “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law,”37 NEPA 
will not permanently halt a challenged project.38  
                                                                                                                     
31 South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993). See also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. 
South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the land taken was “of great value 
because the river bottomland was well suited for raising and grazing domestic animals and was rich in 
game, and the river was well stocked with fish”). 
32 Bourland, 508 U.S. at 697.   
33 See id. (explaining that certain rights were reserved in the trust lands, such as “the right to hunt 
and fish”); see also Lower Brule, 711 F.2d at 813, 824–26 (expressing that flood control projects do not 
suggest a congressional intent to abrogate Indian rights to hunt and fish); Tompkins, supra note 5, at 11 
(“[N]either the Oahe Acts nor the Flood Control Act extinguished Sioux tribal hunting and fishing 
rights over the taken territory.”). 
34 Gregor Aisch & K.K. Rebecca Lai, The Conflicts Along 1,172 Miles of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/23/us/dakota-access-pipeline-
protest-map.html (last updated Mar. 20, 2017). 
35 Jessica A. Shoemaker, Pipelines, Protest, and Property, 27 GREAT PLAINS RES. 69, 77 (2017). 
36 EPA, What is the National Environmental Policy Act?, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/nepa/what-national-environmental-policy-act (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
37 Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 16. 
38 See Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 16 
(2006) (explaining that if the agency follows NEPA’s procedural requirements, the statute is satisfied). 
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A. NEPA: An Introduction 
NEPA requires agencies to study and consider the environmental 
consequences of their proposed actions.39 The statute does not mandate 
environmentally-friendly actions; it is instead a “procedural” requirement 
that agencies must comply with when proposing “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”40 The statute 
requires certain detailed analyses that are regulated by the Council for 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) under the Executive Office of the 
President.41 The two types of documents produced through NEPA are 
environmental assessments and environmental impact statements. 
An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a more thorough and 
intensive review than an Environmental Assessment (EA).42 When 
environmental impacts are not “significant” or the agency is unsure of their 
significance, an agency can prepare an environmental assessment.43 If after 
the preparation of an EA, the agency does not believe there will be a 
significant impact on the environment, the agency will issue a finding of 
no significant impact (FONSI).44 If there is a significant environmental 
impact, then an EIS is required.45  
Through these procedural requirements, NEPA is often a valuable tool 
for advocates arguing against a federal project because of its harmful 
environmental effects. But NEPA has been criticized for the “discretion” it 
grants agencies in estimating possible future harm to the environment.46 
                                                                                                                     
39 See Summary of the National Environmental Policy Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-national-environmental-policy-act (last visited Feb. 
27, 2019) (“NEPA’s basic policy is to assure that all branches of government give proper consideration 
to the environment prior to undertaking any major federal action that significantly affects the 
environment.”). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012). See also Jamison E. Colburn, The Risk in Discretion: Substantive 
NEPA’s Significance, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 14–15 (2016) (discussing NEPA’s discretionary 
decision making as a procedural inquiry). 
41 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).  
42 See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
NEPA 11–19 (2007), available at https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/get-involved/Citizens_Guide_Dec07.pdf 
(discussing the process for an environmental assessment compared with that of an environmental 
impact statement, which requires (1) notice of intent and scoping; (2) a draft EIS with public 
participation through a comment period; (3) analysis of the comments and creating a final EIS; and (4) 
issuing a record of decision). 
43 Id. at 8. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 8, 13. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (explaining that detailed statements by responsible 
officials are necessary when proposed legislation or major Federal actions can significantly affect the 
environment). 
46 See Colburn, supra note 40, at 44, 53 (“If an agency convinces itself that its actions are of little 
consequence, it will skew the alternatives considered and conventional estimative techniques can easily 
do so.”). But see Uma Outka, NEPA and Environmental Justice: Integration, Implementation, and 
Judicial Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 601, 605 (2006) (explaining positively that “NEPA is 
widely regarded as an invaluable, if indirect, protective measure because it makes environmental 
considerations a central part of federal decisionmaking and opens the process to public dialogue and 
scrutiny”). 
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NEPA requires the complying agency to take a “hard look” at its proposed 
action in the environmental context; if the agency has failed in this regard, 
it is left up to private groups to challenge the agency action.47 If the court 
decides the agency did not fully comply with the consideration 
requirements, the court can grant an injunction to halt the action.48 When 
applied to tribal nations, NEPA has been described as unhelpful, providing 
“limited protection to tribal communities in the path of energy 
development.”49 As a litigation tool, it can halt projects procedurally when 
an agency has not substantially complied with the level of review required 
by the statute, but use of NEPA’s “substantive” mandates have been a far 
cry from providing relief.50  
Courts review NEPA challenges under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) when reviewing the agency’s adherence to procedure.51 When 
an agency has decided to not issue an EIS or a flawed EA, a court 
considers whether the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion.”52 Because of this “narrow standard,” a court is unable to 
substitute their best judgment for the agency’s.53 There are divergent 
opinions on the scope of judicial review: should the agency decision be 
considered substantively or only procedurally?54 Under Vermont Yankee v. 
NRDC, the Supreme Court explained, “NEPA does set forth significant 
substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is 
essentially procedural,”55 and as a result a court cannot require extra 
procedure or mandate the decision a court thinks best. But it is possible 
under the APA to require something more from the statute because without 
clear consideration of environmental factors, achievement of NEPA’s 
statutory goals is impossible.56  
                                                                                                                     
47 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Role of NEPA in Fossil Fuel Resource Development and Use in the 
Western United States, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 283, 289 (2012). 
48 See id. (“NEPA provides no sanctions for a failure to comply, judges have used their equity 
power to enjoin a project from moving forward until NEPA’s requirements are satisfied.”). 
49 See Nadia B. Ahmad, Trust or Bust: Complications with Tribal Trust Obligations and 
Environmental Sovereignty, 41 VT. L. REV. 799, 828, 835 (2017) (“Judicial interpretation of NEPA’s 
language has prevented tribes from obtaining a remedy through the statute.”). 
50 See Colburn, supra note 40, at 3 (“Proposals directly to the courts that they execute NEPA’s 
substantive aspects have remained heart-felt but mostly pointless.”). 
51 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 121–22 
(D.D.C. 2017). See also Czarnezki, supra note 38, at 13 (stating that the APA governs judicial review 
of NEPA). 
52 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 122 (citation omitted). 
53 Id. at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 Czarnezki, supra note 38, at 4. 
55 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
56 While there is difficulty in interpreting NEPA substantively under the APA’s arbitrary and 
capricious standard, it is still possible. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 
U.S. 223, 231 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I do not subscribe to the Court’s apparent suggestion 
that Vermont Yankee limits the reviewing court to the essentially mindless task of determining whether 
an agency ‘considered’ environmental factors even if that agency may have effectively decided to 
ignore those factors in reaching its conclusion. . . . Our cases establish that the arbitrary-or-capricious 
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In addition to the other regulatory duties under NEPA, the CEQ 
provides guidance for agencies in dealing with environmental justice 
considerations under the statute.57 Environmental justice was recognized in 
an executive order under the Clinton Administration58 and is required when 
minority populations, such as Native Americans, suffer “disproportionately 
high and adverse human health or environmental effects” from federal 
agency actions.59 The Executive Order requires consultation with the 
community during the course of a federal project assessment, “mitigation 
measures,” and special considerations for those with “subsistence 
consumption of fish, vegetation, or wildlife.”60 Under CEQ guidance, 
“[w]here environments of Indian tribes may be affected, agencies must 
consider pertinent treaty . . . rights and consult with tribal governments in a 
manner consistent with the government-to-government relationship.”61   
Additional EPA guidance underscores the importance of this order, 
stating that “many studies have established that sources of environmental 
hazards are often located and concentrated in areas that are dominated by 
minority populations, low-income populations, or indigenous peoples[.]”62 
In a 2016 report, the CEQ noted that Native Americans may garner 
additional consideration as a “transient and/or geographically dispersed 
population[]” that faces alternate risks due to more environmental exposure 
and possible risks therein.63 While agency recommendations exist for how 
to consider environmental justice, environmental justice is not a 
                                                                                                                     
standard prescribes a ‘searching and careful’ judicial inquiry designed to ensure that the agency has not 
exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner.”); see also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 
952 (7th Cir. 1973) (“NEPA is silent as to judicial review, and no special reasons appear for not 
reviewing the decision of the agency. To the contrary, the prospect of substantive review should 
improve the quality of agency decisions and should make it more likely that the broad purposes of 
NEPA will be realized.”); Czarnezki, supra note 38, at 14–15 (discussing one approach to APA 
interpretation requires a “reasoned, not merely informed, decision-making” (emphasis omitted)). 
57 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1997), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
02/documents/ej_guidance_nepa_ceq1297.pdf. See also Dan McGovern, The Battle over the 
Environmental Impact Statement in the Campo Indian Landfill War, 3 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 145, 149 (1995) (“However, if EPA is toothless, so is CEQ, because CEQ also lacks authority 
to require federal agencies to comply with its rulings.”). In addition, the Environmental Protection 
Agency has also issued guidance for agencies considering environmental justice. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
06/documents/ejtg_5_6_16_v5.1.pdf.  
58 Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
59 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 57, at 1, 3. 
60 Id. at 3–4.  
61 Id. at 14 (discussing how a minority group’s “cultural practices” should be acknowledged, 
along with specific treaty rights considerations). 
62 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 57, at 15 (citations omitted). The guidance continues 
that these populations face more “adverse health conditions” that could be traced back to environmental 
causes. Id. 
63 FED. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON ENVTL. JUSTICE, PROMISING PRACTICES FOR EJ 
METHODOLOGIES IN NEPA REVIEWS 30 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
08/documents/nepa_promising_practices_document_2016.pdf. 
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discretionary mechanism, and it is required under NEPA as outlined by the 
Clinton Executive Order.64  
For pipeline projects and tribal nations, environmental justice is, and 
remains, a necessary consideration under NEPA. This is especially 
applicable in the realm of the Standing Rock tribe’s treaty rights, which 
require separate and greater consideration because they are indigenous 
people with a property right to hunt and fish around the waters of Lake 
Oahe.65 In the future, courts should look to environmental justice when 
reviewing challenges from minority groups such as Native American 
tribes. For example, environmental justice concerns should trigger the 
agency to find a potential “significant impact” that requires the weightier 
Environmental Impact Statement.66  
B. The Dakota Access Pipeline Challenge and District Court Ruling 
After other strategies failed, the Sioux Tribes began litigation against 
the easement for the Dakota Access Pipeline in 2016. The tribes first 
requested a preliminary injunction to halt the pipeline in August 2016 
under the National Historic Preservation Act and NEPA, which was denied 
by the court.67 But then the Obama Administration began to cooperate with 
the tribes’ request,68 so they no longer needed to pursue the suit. Later, 
when the Trump Administration refrained from further environmental 
review and granted the pipeline’s easement in February 2017, the Standing 
Rock Tribe re-initiated its challenge to the pipeline.69 In the latest 
challenge, the D.C. District Court ruled in June 2017 that the Army Corps 
of Engineers had not sufficiently complied with NEPA, but the court 
allowed the pipeline to pump crude oil.70 What led the court to find 
                                                                                                                     
64 Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
65 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 57, at 15. CEQ guidance explains the required 
analysis for an agency faced with an environmental justice question. “[T]he agency should state clearly 
in the EIS or EA whether, in light of all of the facts and circumstances, a disproportionately high and 
adverse human health or environmental impact on minority populations, low-income populations, or 
Indian tribe is likely to result from the proposed action and any alternatives. This statement should be 
supported by sufficient information for the public to understand the rationale for the conclusion. The 
underlying analysis should be presented as concisely as possible, using language that is understandable 
to the public and that minimizes use of acronyms or jargon.” Id.  
66 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 57, at 10; see also Note, Judicial Review, 
Delegation, and Public Hearings under NEPA, 1974 DUKE L.J. 423, 429 (1974) (arguing that the term 
“significantly” in the statute should be construed broadly and provides a “low threshold” for when an 
EIS should be prepared). 
67 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7, 24 (D.D.C. 
2016). 
68 Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota Access Pipeline Fight, NPR (Feb. 22, 2017, 4:28 
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-
access-pipeline-fight. 
69 Id. 
70 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91, 94 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
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noncompliance, yet still allow the flawed action to proceed?  
The Cheyenne River Tribe began the challenge by requesting a 
preliminary injunction under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) on February 9, 2017, alleging that it would not be able to practice 
its religion without access to pure lake waters.71 The court denied the 
motion for a preliminary injunction.72 Dakota Access had also requested a 
protective order to protect certain documents from being released to the 
public.73 These documents included spill models, geographic response 
plans, and a prevention response plan.74 The court was not convinced and 
denied the motion except for certain redacted information in the spill 
models.75 
After the second failed attempt to halt the pipeline by challenging it 
under RFRA, the tribe filed an expedited motion for summary judgment 
grounded in how the pipeline will affect the environment surrounding the 
reservation.76 The partial motion for summary judgment was based on 
NEPA and the tribe’s treaties.77 The tribe’s motion emphasized the 
importance of access to clean water from Lake Oahe for the reservation.78 
Additionally, the tribe pointed to its treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather 
on Lake Oahe and surrounding areas.79 For example, the motion noted, the 
ability to hunt is essential to the Standing Rock people because of “high 
poverty levels” and “cultural and religious practices” on the reservation.80  
The tribe rested its legal argument on the Corps’ failure to prepare a 
full EIS,81 specifically arguing that the EA failed to consider, inter alia, 
environmental justice and take a “hard look” at how the pipeline would 
affect the tribe’s treaty rights.82 In response, Dakota Access argued that the 
tribe had been afforded enough process under NEPA and that the current 
EA is sufficient, stating that the pipeline was originally halted due to 
                                                                                                                     
71 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77, 82, 89 (D.D.C. 
2017), appeal dismissed sub nom. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 17-
5043, 2017 WL 4071136 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2017). 
72 Id. at 100. 
73 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d 516, 518 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
74 Id. Dakota Access sought to protect the pipeline from “terrorists” or individuals with 
“malicious intent” who could do “intentional damage.” Id.  
75 Id. at 524. 
76 Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22.  
77 Id. at 7, 17. 
78 Id. at 4–5. The motion explains that the tribe uses the water from the Lake for many purposes, 
such as agriculture, industry, hospitals, and schools in the reservation.  
79 Id. The tribe argues these were both specified in the Fort Laramie Treaty and preserved in 
response to the Lake Oahe creation. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 17. 
82 Id. at 17, 24. 
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“[p]olitical interference.”83 The Corps also countered that (1) the tribe does 
not adequately argue that the FONSI by the Corps was erroneous; (2) the 
withdrawal of a notice to prepare an EIS is not a “reversal of agency 
policy”; and (3) the tribe cannot point to a trust obligation of the federal 
government that the granting of an easement would breach.84  
On June 14, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part Standing 
Rock’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment.85 The court did not agree 
with Standing Rock that the Corps’ analysis of the chance of an oil spill 
and discussion of alternate routes was inadequate, nor did it agree with 
Standing Rock that the Corps was required to look at the cumulative risk.86 
But on several other claims, Judge Boasberg did find the law on the side of 
the tribe. The court held that the Corps “failed to adequately consider” the 
likelihood that the pipeline would be controversial and how a spill would 
affect the tribe’s treaty rights or environmental justice.87 
In considering how NEPA affected the tribe’s treaty rights, the court 
dismissed the “existential-scope analysis” that the tribe requested and 
instead opted for an analysis of whether the “agency adequately analyze[d] 
impacts on the resource covered by a given treaty.”88 When performing 
this analysis, the court deemed the consideration given in the construction 
phase of the pipeline adequate, but it found that the Corps had not gone far 
enough when considering the spill impacts on the tribe’s hunting and 
aquatic resources.89  
This begs the question of what is enough consideration to satisfy the 
requirements of NEPA. NEPA regulations state that “[t]he NEPA process 
is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on 
understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that 
protect, restore, and enhance the environment.”90 But under NEPA, the 
agency is not obligated to choose the most environmentally friendly 
option, but instead must be made aware of any possible future 
environmental issues before making a decision.91 At first glance this seems 
                                                                                                                     
83 Response of Dakota Access, LLC in Opposition to Plaintiff Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. 
Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-cv-1534-JEB). 
84 U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs’ Opposition to Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment & Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2–3, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-cv-01534-JEB). 
85 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 160 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
86 Id. at 126–27, 130, 135. 
87 Id. at 147. 
88 Id. at 131. 
89 Id. at 132–33. 
90 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1978) (emphasis added). 
91 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 41, at 5; see also 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (2018) (requiring federal agencies to “identify and develop methods and 
procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of 
this chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be 
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at odds with the aforementioned regulation, which appears to prescribe a 
dual mandate to make environmentally educated decisions but also to “take 
actions” that benefit the environment.  
In his analysis, Judge Boasberg did point to what the Corps did 
correctly in its consideration of the treaty rights and water resources. For 
example, the Corps had used a model that described benzene amounts that 
could be released into Lake Oahe.92 The model concluded that in the event 
of an oil spill, the benzene toxicity of the water would not be too high to 
safely drink.93 But the court pointed out that no such analysis had been 
provided in regards to the fish and game the tribe relies on in the Lake 
Oahe region.94 If the Corps had put forth models showing the effect of an 
oil spill on the aquatic life of Lake Oahe and the surrounding wildlife, this 
might be considered a sufficient analysis. Or if the Corps were able to 
produce an estimation that a spill wouldn’t result in adverse conditions for 
these treaty rights, then this would likely pass muster and it could proceed.  
Relying on the environmental justice Executive Order, the tribe’s 
motion for summary judgment pointed to CEQ guidance, which requests a 
more pointed look at the effect an agency action will have on a tribal 
nation.95 The tribe specifically argued that the Corps intentionally 
“gerrymandered” the locations it focused on for its environmental justice 
analysis.96 The Corps’ Environmental Assessment briefly mentions 
environmental justice as to the Standing Rock tribe, but found it to be a 
nonissue.97 
The tribe described flaws in the analysis, including that it did not 
contain Sioux County—the county that had a population with specific 
environmental justice considerations.98 The Corps used a half mile radius 
around the proposed easement and left out the reservation which was only 
.55 miles from the disputed area.99 The court concluded this buffer area 
                                                                                                                     
given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations” 
(emphasis added)); W. Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 721 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 
2013) (explaining that “NEPA dictates the process by which federal agencies must examine 
environmental impacts, but does not impose substantive limits on agency conduct. Rather, it serves to 
promote informed agency decision making, government transparency, and public access to 
information” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
92 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 133.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 134. 
95 Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 27–28. 
96 Id. at 37–38. The tribe pointed to the use of “census tracts” that included an almost entirely 
white population that would be not very affected by an oil spill that occurred downstream.  
97 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE 
PROJECT, CROSSINGS OF FLOWAGE EASEMENTS AND FEDERAL LANDS 85–87 (July 2016) (“The 
pipeline route expressly and intentionally does not cross the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation and is 
not considered an Environmental Justice issue.”). 
98 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 137. 
99 Id.  
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seemed unreasonable.100 Just as with the treaty rights analysis, the court 
found that more consideration was needed for the effects of an oil spill on 
the downstream population of the Standing Rock reservation.101 
This third attempt at halting the pipeline was only moderately 
successful—with the court finding errors in the agency’s NEPA analysis, 
but not concluding that the pipeline should be halted.102 In a later ruling, 
the court decided not to enjoin the pipeline even though the Corps granted 
it as a result of a flawed EA, acknowledging that “[w]ithout such an 
easement, the oil cannot flow through the pipeline.”103 Because the issues 
with the pipeline could necessitate a fuller Environmental Impact 
Statement, but could also be satisfied by an Environmental Assessment, the 
court decided on October 11, 2017 to allow the pipeline to continue its 
operations over the tribe’s objections.104  
In an aside that foreshadows the likelihood of the Corps’ success on 
the environmental justice issue, the court stated that “even if Defendants 
did conclude on remand that a crossing at the Lake Oahe site may 
disproportionately affect minority or tribal populations, such an outcome 
would not compel the Corps to alter its prior decision to issue an EA and 
FONSI.”105 This demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the NEPA 
requirements and draws into question its ultimate efficacy in providing the 
tribe with relief. Since NEPA does not require the agency to take the 
environmentally conscious route, even if the Corps decided that the oil 
spill would disproportionately affect the Standing Rock Sioux tribe over 
neighboring populations, the court believes it can still grant the easement 
under this theory.106 As long as the agency has complied with the 
consideration requirements of the statute, there seems to be nothing further 
the court can require. Ultimately, the issue of the agency’s discretion 
comes into play, armed now with the knowledge that an oil spill might 
disproportionately affect the Sioux and deciding whether to continue with 
the agency action. 
III. TREATY RIGHTS, A NECESSARY CONSIDERATION 
Agency decisions made under NEPA must protect tribal treaty rights 
and fulfill the trust responsibility to Indian tribes. Some suggest that NEPA 
and treaty rights “are a wholly separate and distinct consideration” from 
                                                                                                                     
100 See id. at 138 (“The Court is hard pressed to conclude that the Corps’ selection of a 0.5–mile 
buffer was reasonable.”). 
101 Id. at 139–40.  
102 Id. at 112. 
103 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91, 94, 109 
(D.D.C. 2017). 
104 Id. at 94, 100–03, 109.  
105 Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
106 Id.  
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one another.107 But they do not have to be. While NEPA does not include 
“specific” mention of tribal treaty rights,108 treaty rights should be 
considered under NEPA, or in conjunction with the statute, during the 
agency’s environmental analysis. An EA or an EIS provides thorough 
information on the environmental risks to natural resources, and analyzing 
environmental effects on treaty rights separately would be duplicative and 
wasteful.109 By considering treaty rights along with NEPA, a federal 
agency can comply with dual mandates: to honor their tribal obligations 
and understand environmental impacts. Recognizing and analyzing treaty 
rights under NEPA provides legitimacy to long-recognized tribal rights and 
can help eliminate tribal concerns that their rights will be ignored. Without 
a part in NEPA review, agency decisions will be haphazard. If performed 
together, it will allow a fully informed decision-making process for a 
proposed action.  
Tribes can use NEPA as a litigation tool to halt or slow agency actions 
they oppose. Because many Native Americans live on reservations, 
environmental impacts affect tribes to a greater degree than non-tribal 
residents.110 The tribal relationship with the land is further complicated by 
the ambitions of the federal government to use federal lands for projects 
such as mining,111 energy production,112 and transportation 
improvements.113 But these projects cannot be approved with complete 
                                                                                                                     
107 Bart J. Freedman & Benjamin A. Meyer, Considering the Difference: Treaty Rights and NEPA 
Review, LAW360 (Aug. 29, 2016, 4:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/833840/considering-the-
difference-treaty-rights-and-nepa-review. 
108 Monte Mills, Serving the National Interest? Tribal Rights and Federal Obligations from 
Dakota Access to Keystone XL, JURIST (Apr. 12, 2017, 1:53 PM), 
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2017/04/Monte-Mills-keystone-xl.php (“While the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agency analysis of the potential environmental 
impacts, that law does not expressly demand specific consideration of the rights reserved by tribes in 
treaties with the federal government.”). 
109 See supra Part II.A. 
110 Due to the lack of free movement because of the nature of the reservation system, Native 
Americans face more “severe threats” from environmental degradation. See Mary Christina Wood & 
Zachary Welcker, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part I): The Emerging Tribal Role in the Conservation 
Trust Movement, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 373, 375 (2008) (“By reclaiming a significant degree of 
sovereignty over natural lands, tribes can help arrest the hemorrhaging of natural systems brought about 
by federal and state trustee mismanagement of these assets.”). See also Tompkins, supra note 5, at 30 
(“The Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Reservations are the permanent and irreplaceable 
homelands for the Tribes. Their core identity and livelihood depend upon their relationship to the land 
and environment – unlike a resident of Bismarck, who could simply relocate if the DAPL pipeline 
fouled the municipal water supply, Tribal members do not have the luxury of moving away from an 
environmental disaster without also leaving their ancestral territory.”). 
111 See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, No. 4:17-cv-00030 (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2017) (challenging the reversal of a 
moratorium on coal leasing on federal lands). 
112 See Colo. River Indian Tribes v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 5:14-cv-02504, 2015 WL 
12661945, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2015) (challenging a Bureau of Land Management approval for a 
solar power plant in the Mojave Desert). 
113 See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 569 (9th Cir. 
1998) (challenging the Federal Aviation Administration for airport expansion plans). 
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disregard for treaty rights due to potential detrimental environmental 
effects. Tribes have long litigated their treaty rights, leading to gradual 
recognition by the nation’s courts. Fishing, hunting, and other rights to 
natural resources play a prominent role in this litigation. Oftentimes when 
tribes ceded land in a treaty, they would reserve “off-reservation” treaty 
rights to preserve their ability to hunt and fish on that ceded land.114  
The Supreme Court affirmed the importance of these rights in United 
States v. Winans in 1905, in construing the Yakima treaty rights to fish on 
the Columbia River in Washington.115 The tribe’s fishing grounds were 
obstructed by non-Indian fishing wheels, and the fishermen attempted to 
exclude the tribe.116 In considering the case, the Court declared “[t]he right 
to resort to the fishing places in controversy . . . were not much less 
necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they 
breathed.”117  Further, the Court stated that “the treaty was not a grant of 
rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them . . . .”118 These rights, 
the Court held, could not be limited by state law or property rights.119  
Some federal regulations do protect tribal treaty rights,120 but not under 
NEPA. Specific treaty rights considerations are not outlined when an 
agency is deciding to prepare an EIS under NEPA.121 The agency is 
required to consider “[p]ossible conflicts” with tribes in an EIS and to give 
notice to the tribal government.122 But when deciding whether to perform a 
more intensive environmental review, the agency is driven by a standard of 
whether the action will “significantly affect[] the quality of the human 
environment.”123 The regulations do state that “[s]ignificance varies with 
the setting of the proposed action.”124 Given these regulations, a tribe could 
argue that significance is met when implicating treaty rights because of the 
“setting” in tribal territory. Inherently, tribal rights can be a complex and 
                                                                                                                     
114 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 24, § 18.02; see United States v. 
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905) (describing the process of creating off-reservation rights, “[t]he 
object of the treaty was to limit the occupancy to certain lands and to define rights outside of them”). 
115 Winans, 198 U.S. at 377. 
116 Id. at 372, 382. 
117 Id. at 381. 
118 Id. (emphasis added).  
119 Id. at 384.  
120 See 25 C.F.R. § 249.1 (1982) (describing the purpose of these regulations as “(1) To assist in 
protecting the off-reservation nonexclusive fishing rights which are secured to certain Indian tribes by 
their treaties with the United States; (2) To promote the proper management, conservation and 
protection of fisheries resources which are subject to such treaties of the United States . . . .”). 
121 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1979) (determining whether an action “[s]ignificantly” affects the 
environment, but not mentioning tribes). An argument can be made that the term “significantly,” which 
requires a contextual and intensity analysis, mandates an EIS because treaty rights are implicated, but 
this is not specified in the regulation. Id. NEPA regulations do detail that “[p]ossible conflicts” between 
the proposed action and the objectives of Indian tribes should be considered under an EIS and that 
notice should be given to Indian tribes. Id. §§ 1502.16, 1506.6.  
122 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16. 
123 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2018). 
124 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a). 
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layered consideration, and it is logical to follow an EIS model when they 
are implicated in a federal project.  
Opponents would likely counter that making a bright line rule would 
lead to an EIS being created for any small federal project that involved a 
tribal resource. But due to the federal government’s trust obligation to 
Native Americans, whatever burden this might cause would be warranted. 
Addressing treaty rights through NEPA is difficult because environmental 
damages are hard to identify.125 While it might seem inherent that the 
implication of essential property rights would lead to the fullest extent of 
environmental review by the federal agency, when an agency is required to 
perform an EIS is not clear. Instead, this is left to the agency’s discretion. 
For example, in guidance provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on 
NEPA actions, natural gas and oil pipelines are left out of the description 
of “Major Actions Normally Requiring an EIS.”126 
A. The Intersection Between Treaty Rights and the Trust Obligation 
The trust obligation should require federal agencies to honor treaty 
rights. When a federal agency allows projects to proceed without a full 
understanding of the effects on treaty rights, its fiduciary duty is breached. 
In the DAPL case, the tribe argued that the trust obligation created a higher 
standard of protection and needed “a substantive outcome.”127 Specifically, 
in its motion for summary judgment, the tribe outlined the source of the 
government’s trust obligation: the taking of the land to create Lake Oahe, 
along with treaties and statutes.128 Through this trust duty, the tribe called 
on the Corps to respect its treaty rights.129 At the very least, other federal 
agencies requested an EIS to analyze more deeply the question of the trust 
responsibility.130 
The trust responsibility requires specific protection of tribal resources 
and rights by the federal government. The relationship between the 
government and Native American tribes comes from three sources: treaties, 
the Constitution, and federal statutes.131 Early in Native American law, the 
trust obligation was discussed in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.132 The Court 
                                                                                                                     
125 See Ahmad, supra note 49, at 835 (“Environmental damages are vastly more intricate than 
monetary damages arising from claims for a contractual breach in a construction contract or failure to 
perform under a services contract. Environmental damages are multifaceted because of complex 
economic, social, cultural, and ecological variables.”). 
126 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 516 DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL 
MANAGING THE NEPA PROCESS § 10.4 (2004).  
127 Mills, supra note 108. 
128 Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 5. 
129 Id. at 6. 
130 Id. at 9. 
131 Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in 
Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307, 1316 (2003). 
132 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831). 
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explained the relationship between a tribe and the federal government as 
“that of a ward to his guardian.”133 The understanding of the trust doctrine 
today can be explained as “the federal government’s duty to protect . . . 
tribal lands, resources, and the native way of life.”134 This protection began 
with the injuries to Native Americans throughout history, requiring the 
federal government to act as a protector over tribal resources.135 Tribes are 
considered separate entities, like independent countries, but can be left 
unable to defend their interests when faced with federal projects. Because 
of this, the government has a fiduciary duty to protect them. 
In the case of the Dakota Access Pipeline, is the trust obligation for the 
Corps a general mandate or grounded in specific fiduciary authority? The 
Standing Rock tribe argued that because the Corps has a fiduciary duty to 
them as a “trustee,” before the Corps grants the easement it will have to 
consider the impacts on the tribe and treaty rights more seriously.136 The 
tribe cites to Northwest Sea Farms, where the court stated that “[i]t is this 
fiduciary duty, rather than any express regulatory provision, which 
mandates that the Corps take treaty rights into consideration.”137 This 
understanding of the trust obligation seems to indicate a fiduciary duty to 
incorporate treaty rights into agency decision-making. But this is 
complicated by the inclination of other courts to avoid the trust obligation 
without a specific statutory ground. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
explained: 
 
[A]lthough the United States does owe a general trust 
responsibility to Indian tribes, unless there is a specific duty that 
has been placed on the government with respect to Indians, this 
responsibility is discharged by the agency’s compliance with 
general regulations and statutes not specifically aimed at protecting 
Indian tribes.138  
 
So, does the trust responsibility mandate any action here? The previous 
Solicitor General agreed that more must be done, and the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army agreed that, at the very least, a full EIS should be 
prepared to discuss the treaty rights issue.139 But the DAPL court declined 
to extend the trust obligation without “a specific statute, treaty, executive 
                                                                                                                     
133 Id. at 17. 
134 Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine 
Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1496 (1994). 
135 Id. 
136 Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 40–41. 
137 Id. at 6 (quoting Nw. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 
(W.D. Wash. 1996)). In Northwest Sea Farms, the Corps denied a permit because of the effect it would 
have on the tribe’s treaty rights to fish. 
138 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1998). 
139 Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 42. 
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order, or other provision that gives rise to specific fiduciary duties.”140 
The tribe does have statutory grounds for its trust argument: the Act 
creating the Oahe Dam and the Fort Laramie treaty. The Standing Rock 
tribe has fishing and hunting rights granted by the federal government that 
an oil spill on Lake Oahe would affect. Public Law 85-915 (the Act 
concerning the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project) provided for hunting, 
fishing, and grazing rights for the Standing Rock people.141 The rights 
outlined in the Act would be suffocated in the event of an oil spill in Lake 
Oahe, violating the specific trust obligation. In a D.C. Circuit case, Cobell 
v. Norton, the court reviewed the trust relationship between the 
Departments of the Interior and Treasury in the management of Indian 
Money accounts.142 There, the court explained that “failure to specify the 
precise nature of the fiduciary obligation or to enumerate the trustee’s 
duties” does not always “absolve[] the government of its 
responsibilities.”143 In Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, the court stated 
that “[t]he United States has a fiduciary duty and ‘moral obligations of the 
highest responsibility and trust’ to protect the Indians’ treaty rights.”144 
Here, the Corps serves as a fiduciary for the property right145 which the 
tribe possesses in its right to hunt and fish. 
Any argument that there is no source for a fiduciary relationship in the 
context of DAPL can be dispelled by the Oahe Dam Act—where specific 
rights were outlined in exchange for the land sold by the tribes. As a result, 
the DAPL court should have held the Corps to a higher standard regarding 
their trust duty to the Standing Rock people even though specific fiduciary 
duties were not outlined in the Act. Under Cobell, federal agencies do not 
possess as much discretion if the agency is a fiduciary for the tribe.146 The 
court explained that deference by the courts to agency understandings of 
“ambiguous statutes entrusted to it for administration” is not appropriate 
here because statutes must be construed “liberally” for the “benefit” of 
Indian tribes.147 In Cobell, the main statute was the Administrative 
Procedure Act, but the same argument can be made for NEPA, an agency 
procedural statute. This “liberal” reading of the statute lends more 
credence to the trust argument brought by Standing Rock. But this 
                                                                                                                     
140 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 144 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
141 Pub. L. No. 85-915, § 10, 72 Stat. 1762, 1764 (1958).  
142 240 F.3d 1081, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In this case, the Department of the Interior and the 
Department of the Treasury were specifically delegated as trustees by law. Id. 
143 See id. at 1099 (“The Secretary has an ‘overriding duty . . . to deal fairly with Indians.’ This 
duty necessarily constrains the Secretary’s discretion.” (citation omitted)). 
144 Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1510–11 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (citation 
omitted). 
145 Id. at 1510 (“The Tribes’ right to take fish is a property right, protected under the fifth 
amendment.”).  
146 Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1099. 
147 Id. at 1101. 
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argument for a specific fiduciary duty did not succeed with the DAPL 
court.148  
B. Law Regarding Treaty Rights & the Trust Obligation 
Federal agencies must consider the effects of a proposed project on 
tribal treaty rights, and courts rely on these effects in deciding cases with 
alleged NEPA violations.149 A Washington district court considered tribal 
treaty rights when it granted a tribe’s request for a preliminary injunction 
after the Corps issued a permit for the construction of a marina after 
performing an EIS.150 The tribe used the proposed area for fishing 
chinook.151 After performing a NEPA analysis, the Corps issued a permit 
for the marina after considering treaty rights.152 But because the tribe was 
able to show “irreparable injury” to its treaty right, the court granted an 
injunction.153 While the case was based in NEPA, the court decided the 
treaty rights issue before considering the tribe’s NEPA argument. In 
another case, however, a Washington district court denied a preliminary 
injunction after the tribe was unable to demonstrate sufficient harm to its 
treaty rights stemming from a NEPA decision to build a wharf by the 
Navy.154 
Even if an agency has considered treaty rights in its NEPA analysis, 
the environmental evaluation allows for insight into adverse results on 
treaty rights for the court. In No Oilport! v. Carter, the court denied a 
motion for summary judgment in favor of a tribe because the agency action 
might violate the tribe’s treaty rights.155 There, the tribes were worried—as 
the Standing Rock tribe is today—that its water source would be polluted 
by a pipeline.156 Under NEPA, the plaintiffs alleged similar claims to those 
alleged in the Standing Rock case, including “inadequate evaluation of 
impacts.”157 Here, the federal district court for the Western District of 
Washington considered what was procedurally adequate under NEPA to 
                                                                                                                     
148 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 145 (D.D.C. 
2017).  
149 Tompkins, supra note 5, at 3.  
150 Muckleshoot, 698 F. Supp. at 1505. Because the court granted the preliminary injunction on 
the treaty rights issue, the court did not decide whether the Corps had violated NEPA by failing to 
consider the tribe’s fishing right. Id. at 1517. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1507 (“The permit included special permit conditions (‘SPCs’) to mitigate some impacts 
of the Marina on the Tribes’ treaty fishing rights.”). 
153 Id. at 1517. 
154 Ground Zero Ctr. for Nonviolent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 
1138, 1152, 1156, on reconsideration in part, No. 12-CV-1455, 2013 WL 357509 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 
29, 2013). 
155 No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 373 (W.D. Wash. 1981). 
156 Id. at 344.  
157 Id. at 352.  
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satisfy the tribes’ oil spill concerns.158 Among the factors the EIS 
considered were: oil spill frequency, the results if a leak occurred, and the 
effects of an oil spill on tribal fishing.159 The court analyzed the EIS under 
the tribal treaty context, specifically the effect it would have on the tribes’ 
fishing grounds.160 Unlike the DAPL EA, this EIS discussed the ways the 
pipeline could affect their treaty rights, along with some negative 
outcomes.161 As a result, the court found the agency had complied with the 
statute’s requirements.162  
But the tribes also raised an independent violation of treaty rights 
claim based on the defendants’ actions.163 The EIS, which outlined the 
negative impacts of a possible spill on spawning, supported this claim.164 
The court explained that “[i]t is uncontested that if a large enough oil leak 
or spill did occur, it could significantly degrade the fish habitat.”165 The 
court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because there 
was a possibility that the oil pipeline might “proximately cause” the fishing 
grounds to be destroyed, demonstrating a recognition of the tribes’ rights 
even though the Agency had complied with NEPA.166 
According to the Solicitor General of the Interior, the concerns in No 
Oilport! can be applied to the Standing Rock case.167 Following No 
Oilport!, calling on the Army Corps to adequately consider the effects of 
an oil spill on the aquatic life and wildlife of the Lake Oahe region should 
be an effective strategy for the tribe. In the tribe’s motion for summary 
judgment, it described its need for “subsistence fishery” and use of the 
shore along Lake Oahe for wild game.168 If the Corps concludes that there 
will be an adverse effect on these explicitly guaranteed treaty rights, then 
perhaps the tribe could succeed on its claim, just as the court decided in No 
Oilport! that there was a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.  
 Northwest Sea Farms v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recognized the 
importance of treaty rights when an agency is deciding to grant permits.169 
While not strictly decided under NEPA, the Corps used treaty rights of the 
                                                                                                                     
158 Id. at 354.  
159 Id.  
160 See id. at 354, 356 (“The impacts of minor and major spills and leaks are discussed, including 
the effect of a spill or leak on Indian fisheries.”). 
161 See id. at 356 (“The EIS acknowledges that a major rupture ‘could result in significant loss to 
Native American tribal fish enterprises in western Washington.’”). 
162 Id. at 352. 
163 Id. at 371. 
164 Id. at 372. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 See Tompkins, supra note 5, at 20–21 (“[T]here is a similarly demonstrated possibility of 
impacts on tribal treaty rights that warrant additional review.”). 
168 Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 5. 
169 Nw. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (W.D. Wash. 
1996). 
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Lummi Nation to deny a permit for a fish farm as “against the public 
interest because it would conflict with the Lummi Nation’s fishing 
rights.”170 In contesting the denial, the fish farm argued that treaty rights 
were improperly considered in making the decision.171 The court countered 
that when “carrying out its fiduciary duty, it is . . . the Corps’[] 
responsibility to ensure that Indian treaty rights are given full effect,”172 
explicitly recognizing the fiduciary relationship between the tribe and the 
federal government. While the Corps did not have regulations mandating 
that treaty rights be considered, the court did not find this dispositive 
because of the trust obligation it had to the tribe.173 The court went so far as 
to say the fiduciary duty “mandates” that the Corps consider treaty rights 
when making its decision to grant the permit.174  
Additionally, the Corps argued in Northwest Sea Farms that it was 
required to consider the tribe’s rights to fish under the trust 
responsibility.175 The court explained that this duty extends to the Corps 
permitting decisions and that it is the agency’s responsibility “to ensure 
that Indian treaty rights are given full effect.”176 This responsibility stems 
from the fiduciary duty created by the trust relationship and not an 
“express regulatory provision.”177 The case clearly demonstrates that, in 
the context of permitting decisions by a federal agency, treaty rights must 
be considered under the lens of the trust responsibility. While not 
considered under NEPA, this case shows that a negative treaty rights 
determination should disqualify a federal project from approval, either 
under NEPA or beforehand.  
1. Cultural Resources Under NEPA 
Courts have also chosen to protect cultural tribal resources under 
NEPA. In Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone of Nevada v. U.S. 
Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
allowed for the exploration of a thirty-thousand-acre area for mineral 
drilling after a NEPA analysis.178 The project was located on the Te-
Moak’s “ancestral lands.”179 Along with religious and cultural importance, 
the area was home to pinyon pine trees, whose nuts are important to the 
                                                                                                                     
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1519. 
172 Id. at 1520. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 1519. 
176 Id. at 1520. 
177 Id. 
178 608 F.3d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 2010). 
179 Id. at 597. 
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tribe’s culture.180 Since mining had an adverse effect on these pine trees, 
the plaintiffs introduced a previous study performed by the BLM that 
supported their claim.181 The EA mentioned the removal of some of these 
trees but did not discuss this under the “Native American Religious 
Concerns” part of the assessment.182 The court found the approval of the 
project by the BLM unlawful because of the effects it would have on 
important sources of culture for the Western Shoshone tribe.183 While this 
case considers a food source (the pinyon pine nut) that was previously 
more important to the tribe and is now considered a cultural resource, the 
court moved to protect it under NEPA even without specified treaty rights 
to the pinyon pine.184 Here, the Ninth Circuit interpreted NEPA in a 
manner that required more tribal resource protection, not less, even though 
the land was off-reservation. 
C. United States v. Washington 
The obligation for the United States to honor treaty rights has been 
further explored outside of the NEPA context. A recent case affirmed by a 
per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court, United States v. Washington,185 
also considered treaty rights. The treaty right implicated by the several 
tribes was the right to fish.186 The state government’s use of culverts 
interfered with salmon spawning.187 But the State argued that the treaty 
right does not require “habitat protection.”188 Additionally, the State put 
forth that while the tribes may take a certain amount of fish, the State is not 
required to make sure those fish are “available” for the tribe.189  
In order to analyze the obligation of the State to the tribes, the court 
considered the dialogue and past promises made in tribal treaties.190 The 
court seemed drawn to the following question: Why would the land be set 
aside for the tribes to fish if the government was not required to protect the 
source? Because of this, the court insinuated the promises in tribal treaties 
                                                                                                                     
180 See id. (“The project area also contains many pinyon pine trees, a source of pine nuts that were 
once a key component of the Western Shoshone diet and remain a focal point of Western Shoshone 
culture and ceremony. Although mining has impeded the collection of pine nuts, remnant stands of 
pinyon pine continue to be used as traditional family gathering areas by contemporary Western 
Shoshone.”). 
181 Id. at 606. 
182 Id. at 606 n.14. 
183 See id. at 607 (finding it “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law” under the Administrative Procedure Act). 
184 Id. at 606. 
185 Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832, 1833 (2018) (per curiam). 
186 United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2017). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 960.  
189 Id. at 962.  
190 Id. at 964.  
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were meant to assure the existence of fish as part of the treaty right.191 As a 
result, the court found that Washington State was violating its treaty 
obligations to the tribes.192 This case also stands for permanence of treaty 
rights in the federal courts, as the court explained, “[b]ecause the treaty 
rights belong to the Tribes rather than the United States, it is not the 
prerogative of the United States to waive them.”193  
There are several differences between this case and DAPL. First, the 
harm to the salmon population was actively occurring at the time of the 
lawsuit. The court explained that “salmon stocks in the Case Area have 
declined ‘alarmingly’ since the Treaties were signed, and ‘dramatically’ 
since 1985.”194 In the DAPL case, the alleged harm to the fisheries and 
wildlife is only theoretical and the Corps would argue only finitely so.195 
Because the harm is hypothetical, this makes a claim for the violation of 
treaty rights much more volatile for the court’s consideration. In order to 
follow Washington’s reasoning, the tribe could present evidence of a 
cognizable harm that would occur to specific fish or wildlife populations as 
the result of a spill. For example, one of the exhibits in the tribe’s motion 
for summary judgment contains specific fish species, such as the walleye, 
smallmouth bass, northern pike, and others that are a part of Lake Oahe’s 
aquatic life.196 In Washington, the court heard strong evidence about the 
correlation between changes to culverts and “benefits to salmon.”197 By 
drawing a connection between a specific species, for example the walleye, 
and a defined injury by the pipeline to that species, the tribe could rely on 
the reasoning in Washington. This injury then extends to the tribal 
members because they rely on the Lake Oahe area to find food for the 
winter.198 
                                                                                                                     
191 Id. at 964–65.  
192 Id. at 966. 
193 Id. at 967.  
194 Id. at 961.  
195 But it is not only the Standing Rock tribe that worries about the effects of the pipeline. See 
Patrick M. O’Connell, Dakota Access Pipeline a Mix of Angst, Potential for Those Near Central 
Illinois Tank Farm, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2018, 6:54 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-patoka-tank-farm-20171220-story.html 
(explaining the difficulties farmers are experiencing as a result of the pipeline and fear “about a spill”). 
196 Exhibit 14 to Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Expedited Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Declaration of Jeff Kelly ¶ 4, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-cv-
01534 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Declaration of Jeff Kelly]. The declaration goes on to 
explain the wildlife that lives in the habitat around Lake Oahe, such as different types of deer species, 
elk, and birds. Id. ¶ 6. 
197 Washington, 853 F.3d at 973. 
198 Declaration of Jeff Kelly, supra note 196, ¶ 7. The tribe enlisted the expert opinion of Richard 
B. Kuprewicz of Accufacts, Inc. to discuss the deficiencies in the Agency’s environmental assessment. 
Exhibit 10 to Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Expedited Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Letter to 
Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Sec’y of the Army, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, No. 16-cv-01534 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Letter to Jo-Ellen Darcy]. One of the 
findings from the report details that while the EA discusses the frequency of landslides in areas near the 
pipeline, the EA fails to discuss whether an oil spill would result from such a landslide. Id. The 
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Second, the harm to the salmon fish habitats has a more obvious 
remedy. The court in Washington discussed a “fish passage” that could be 
put into the culverts to allow salmon to continue their usual movements up 
and down stream.199 In the DAPL case, the remedy the tribes are seeking is 
an injunction to halt the pipeline.200 The tribe’s harm comes from a 
possible oil spill, and as a result, there is no visible compromise. But 
perhaps the compromise is to require the Agency to perform an EIS. By 
completing an EIS there could also be a more thorough review of alternate 
routes.201  
But this does not mean that Washington is inapplicable to the DAPL 
case. In applying the Washington case to cases outside the Ninth Circuit, it 
is explained that:  
[T]o the extent that any federal land usage triggers 
evaluations required by the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), it would seem that among the reasonable 
alternatives that a federal agency must consider to comply 
with NEPA would be one protecting treaty fishing rights. 
Further, it may be that the agency would have no choice but 
to select the alternative that protects the right of taking fish, 
since administrative agencies have no authority to terminate 
or curtail treaty rights.202 
In a study of oil spill risks, if harm to a fish population in Lake Oahe could 
be specifically outlined, under this analysis it seems that the federal agency 
would be required to choose the option that did not violate the tribe’s treaty 
right. Along with the tribe’s subsistence fishing is its access to fresh water 
from Lake Oahe. The Solicitor outlined the tribes’ Winters rights203 in her 
memorandum as an “equal consideration as part of the DAPL permitting 
process” compared to the other treaty rights.204 Under the regulations and 
aforementioned cases, NEPA should be read to require treaty right 
                                                                                                                     
Accufacts report is available at the following link: http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/10-28-
16-Final-Accufacts-Report.pdf.  
199 Washington, 853 F.3d at 971. 
200 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 116–17 
(D.D.C. 2017). 
201 The tribe indicates in correspondence with Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Secretary of the Army, 
that “if the Dakota Access pipeline is so safe that it presents no risk at all when situated on the Tribe’s 
doorstep, why isn’t the pipeline safe enough to cross the River north of Bismarck, as originally 
proposed?” Letter to Jo-Ellen Darcy, supra note 198. 
202 Michael C. Blumm, Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and the Environment: Affirming the Right to 
Habitat Protection and Restoration, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1, 31 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
203 The Winters doctrine was outlined by the tribe in the motion for summary judgment explaining 
that the “Winters right is a property right that entails both a sufficient quantity and quality of water to 
meet these beneficial purposes.” Standing Rock Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 4 
(citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908)). The tribe uses the water from Lake Oahe 
for drinking and irrigation purposes, and, as a result, an oil spill would be detrimental. Id. 
204 Tompkins, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
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consideration because agencies do not have the discretion to ignore treaties 
which are already the law of the land. The rights granted to the tribes are 
not vague promises but explicit grants to use the land’s resources in federal 
statute. Without honoring the tribe’s treaty rights, an easement should not 
be granted in the DAPL case. 
D. Where Does This Leave Tribes? 
Agencies must exercise their trustee responsibilities to tribes, but this 
can be erroneously left to discretion. Conflicts can arise when agencies are 
called to mandates that differ from their trust obligation.205 Even within 
NEPA there is an inherent conflict of interest—the statute outlines a 
motivation to “prevent or eliminate damage to the environment,”206 but the 
agency is not required to pick the most environmentally friendly option. 
This is balanced with every agency’s requirement to hold Native resources 
and lands in trust and other agency motives, such as development of the 
nation’s natural resources. These other motivations can then outweigh the 
trust responsibility. The Department of Justice has recognized such 
conflicts.207  
In Northwest Sea Farms, the Corps decided to honor the tribe’s treaty 
rights and not grant a specific permit.208 In DAPL, the Corps decided to the 
contrary.209 Since there is not a clear mandate under NEPA to consider 
treaty rights, courts may continue to give agencies discretion even though 
this violates tribal property interests. But agency discretion is restricted by 
the trust obligation, and agencies must consider environmental effects on 
treaty rights and use these findings in NEPA decision making. Under APA 
judicial review, a court should find that an agency’s disregard of the 
environmental effects a federal project will have on a tribal nation’s treaty 
rights is arbitrary and capricious. While under Vermont Yankee, courts are 
not allowed to mandate additional procedure under the APA,210 considering 
treaty rights is not an extra layer of procedure, but a necessary starting 
point. 
                                                                                                                     
205 Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in 
Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307, 1329–36 (2003) (explaining conflicts 
within the DOJ and their representation of tribal interests). 
206 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
207 Juliano, supra note 205, at 1338. 
208 Nw. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (W.D. Wash. 
1996). 
209 Since the 2017 decision, the Corps has followed up its additional review with the same 
decision—supported by an additional memorandum that is unavailable to the public. Andrew Westney, 
Corps, Dakota Access Say Tribes Didn’t Obey Order, LAW360 (Dec. 7, 2018, 7:26 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1109156/corps-dakota-access-say-tribes-didn-t-obey-order. 
210 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) 
(“Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but 
reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have chosen not to grant them.”). 
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Tribes are more likely to clash with federal agencies than other groups 
because their land exists completely under federal control. In response to 
the current Administration’s energy and environmental policies, it is likely 
that this type of litigation will only continue. For example, the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe filed a lawsuit against the Department of the Interior and 
the Bureau of Land Management in March 2017.211 The lawsuit centers 
around the Agency’s decision to repeal a coal moratorium on federal lands 
and alleges a violation under NEPA for failure to perform an 
environmental review before making this decision.212 Specifically, the suit 
alleges that coal mining will have a negative impact on the Cheyenne 
reservation’s air and water quality and makes use of the environmental 
justice argument.213 This litigation stems from the question that is still 
unclear after the DAPL litigation: whether an agency reversal on an 
environmental policy (like granting an easement for a pipeline) can be 
construed as a NEPA violation or simply a result of changing agency 
policy under a new administration.214  
While many consider NEPA non-substantive, in the context of tribes, 
agencies should be required to consider treaty rights in parallel or before 
the NEPA analysis.215 Since the statute mainly mandates procedural 
requirements,216 it does not promise explicit relief. But coupled with treaty 
rights and the trust obligation, agency discretion is limited when faced with 
a proposed project. While this should not lead to an automatic finding that 
treaty rights trump an agency action, alternative actions and mitigation 
measures should be taken more seriously and should lead to the creation of 
an EIS. Rights to hunt, fish, and gather were reserved at great cost for the 
                                                                                                                     
211 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior, 4:17-cv-00030-BMM (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2017).  
212 Id. at 1–2. The Obama Administration had requested a “programmatic environmental impact 
statement (‘PEIS’)” on how the BLM federal leasing program worked under NEPA. Id. at 3.  
213 Id. at 22–23. 
214 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“An agency may not, for 
example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books. 
And of course the agency must show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” (citation 
omitted)). The tribe argued that this change in administration policy violated the APA under FCC v. 
Fox Television for failing to provide a reasoned explanation for the agency reversal. Standing Rock 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 35–39. But the court did not agree with the tribe. 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 143 (D.D.C. 2017). 
Recently, the Keystone XL pipeline was halted because of NEPA failures. According to the court, 
“[t]he Department instead simply discarded prior factual findings related to climate change to support 
its course reversal.” Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. CV-17-29-GF-BMM, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191510, at *40 (D. Mont. Nov. 8, 2018). A “reasoned explanation” for the Trump 
Administration’s policy change was necessary. Id.  
215 But see Czarnezki, supra note 38, at 7–11 (comparing the decisions of the Supreme Court 
which clearly lean toward a procedural interpretation and those of academics and lower courts which 
find substance in the statute). 
216 See Colburn, supra note 40, at 15 (“The familiar refrain from the Supreme Court has been that 
NEPA only requires agencies to take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of their choices. 
To many this has meant that NEPA is a purely procedural statute.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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tribes and should not be discarded by agencies. When treaty rights are 
considered using the NEPA analysis, the federal agency can fulfill its 
fiduciary duty. 
CONCLUSION 
Along with NEPA, agencies should consider treaty rights that are 
implicated in any agency action. These agencies are called to a higher 
standard of protection under their trust duty to the tribe. The DAPL court 
departed from the views of previous courts by wading into the murky 
waters of environmental justice and finding that deeper consideration of 
treaty rights is required, but the court did not go far enough. The current 
deference to agencies performing NEPA assessments leaves treaty rights 
vulnerable to ideological shifts. But as No Oilport! and Washington 
demonstrated, treaty rights are not simply additional considerations in a 
discretionary analysis.  They are legal obligations, which the United States 
has a trust responsibility to fulfill. It is necessary for the courts to hold 
agencies to a higher standard in NEPA actions when treaty rights are 
involved. Without such a requirement, tribes like Standing Rock will 
continue to have their rights eroded as fossil fuel interests expand.   
 
 
